In the past the Kremlin has shown little tolerance for political challengers. But as Kirill Rogov, an opposition observer, notes, it largely limited its control to politics, manipulating elections and marginalising the opposition. (No political party was allowed to emerge without the sanction of Mr Surkov, Mr Putin’s chief ideologist.) But faced with mass protests by civil activists and ordinary citizens, not politicians, the Kremlin is trying to extend its control to other areas, including the internet and even entertainment magazines which carry protest banners. “The Kremlin is trying to destroy the infrastructure of the protest movement,” says Mr Rogov.
Lacking a coherent ideology, the Kremlin is justifying itself by ratcheting up its confrontation with the West and its search for enemies within. It has partly succeeded: the number who believe that Russia has outside enemies has gone from 13% in 1989 to more than 70%, according to Levada. Nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance, once part of the political fringe, have become mainstream— something even Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Russia’s clownish right-wing nationalist leader, cannot have expected. Confrontation with the West has a polarising effect on the Russian elite, squeezing out those most linked to the West and strengthening the siloviki, the security services, who demand more purges.
